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Abstract
We show that the problem of whether two Turing Machines are functionally equivalent is
undecidable and explain why this is signif− icant for the theory of repeated play and
evolution.
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The wide empirical prevalence of cooperation in prisoner's dilemma type situations where free-
riding is possible has long fascinated economists, game theorists and biologists. The possibility
of punishing free-riding in repeated situations is central to the theory of repeated games, but the
folk-theorem leaves open the possibility of coordination failure and Pareto inferior equilibria. A
key question addressed in the evolutionary literature is whether cooperation is merely possible,
or whether in fact there are evolutionary forces that push in the direction of cooperation. There
are a number of afrmative answers to the question: central to evolutionary forces that lead to
cooperative outcomes is the ability to identify free-riders so they can be punished.
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There are three basic mechanisms through which deviant free-rider strategies can be detected:
indirectly by observing behavior, through some sort of cheap talk in the form of a secret hand-
shake, or directly by observing the strategies themselves. The secret handshake is a signal that
is secret from free-riders and is discussed by Robson [1990]. In the setting of play between nite
state machines secret handshakes take place through observing play as described in Rubinstein
[1986], for example. The possibility of directly observing strategies is examined in Levine and Pe-
sendorfer [2002] - they show a strong result that the only strategies to survive a stochastic process
of evolution and imitation are strategies that cooperate when they meet themselves, and punish
opponents who use different strategies.
Here we take up the issue of directly observing the strategies used by opponents. In other
words, we envisage a setting where players exchange descriptions of their strategies prior to play.
There are several reasons why this is interesting. First, whether information is generated through
cheap-talk or through observation of behavior, it is not possible to have more information about an
opponents intentions than through direct observation of her strategy. So direct observation gives
an upper bound on how well a player can be informed about an opponent's intentions - any limita-
tions when direction observation is used must also be limitations when intentions must be inferred
indirectly. Second, there are interesting circumstances where direct observation of strategies is
possible. For example, in a biological setting, strategies are encoded in DNA, and direct detec-
tion of DNA or its attributes is possible. A good example of this is the immune system which is
based on detecting free-riders through their chemical attributes rather than their behavior. In the
economic setting, institutions that make it easy to observe opponents strategic rules - for exam-
ple, implementation by third parties, or the ability to credibly reveal the rules that are being used
through institutions such as bureaucracies - are possible and indeed frequent.
Technically, a strategy is simply an algorithm that responds to certain inputs. Computer sci-
entists conjecture that all algorithms that can be implemented and that meet certain minimal re-
quirements are Turing machines,
2 so this is a natural way in which to discuss strategic algorithms.
3
Economists such as Binmore [1990] and Anderlini [1990] have explicitly modeled player strate-
gies as Turing Machines: they have focused on showing that there does not exist a machine which
1In the literature on positive assortive matching, discussed, for example in Berstrom [2002], the matching mech-
anism implicitly identies free-riders by matching players based on their play. This can be interpreted as indirectly
detection through observed behavior.
2This is known as Church's Thesis.
3An alternative would be to consider nite state machines, also know as automata, a subclass of Turing Machines
with nite memory. This would lead to a different set of issues: how much success could we expect a machine with n
states to have in identifying the strategy of a machine with some larger number m > n states?
1always gives a best-response to the opponent's strategy.
4 The issues can be illustrated through the
example of matching pennies. Suppose that each player designs a Turing machine that takes as
input the Turing machine designed by the other player. An obvious strategy would be to simulate
the opponent's Turing machine, using your own Turing machine as input. The problem with this
is that when both players use such Turing machines, we get an innite regress in which I simulate
you simulating me simulating you...and there is an innite loop. In technical terms, these Turing
machine do not halt when given each other as input, and so are useless in practice.
In the setting of punishing free-riders, the situationis less difcult. It is easy to design a machine
that when given opposing Turing machine as input checks to see if that machine is the same or
different.
5 The strategy is then to cooperate if the opposing machine is the same and punish if it
is different. This is the basis for the Pesendorfer-Levine [2002] result, for example. However, the
same strategy may be described by many different Turing machines. For example, one machine
might engage in some irrelevant preliminary calculations that are later discarded, while another
does not. This raises the question whether it is possible to identify an opponent not by the details
of how their strategy is described, but according to the strategy or function that their algorithm
implements. That is the question addressed in this note. It is important for three reasons. First, the
interesting question about opponent play is how they will behave, not how their code is written.
The question we would like to know from examining an opponent's strategy are of the type: Is my
opponent going to cheat, so I should do likewise? Is he going to engage in a strategy that leaves
him open to exploitation? Second, there is an obvious social disadvantage if machines that differ
merely in external appearance engage in costly punishment against one another. Third, if strategies
can only be determined through observing behavior, then it is evident that only the function of a
machine can be identied.
The questions we will examine, then, is the extent to which it is possible to identify an algorithm
based on its function, rather than on its description.
6 We are not going to require Turing Machines
to predict the strategies of their opponents, but focus on the narrower question at issue in sus-
taining cooperation: can Turing Machine recognize whether their opponents are computationally
equivalent to themselves?
2. THE QUESTION
We let t denote a Turing Machine, and t(x) denote the output of t on input the integer x,7
where t(x) is an integer, or t(x) = ¥ if t does not halt on input x. By convention, since there are
countably many Turing Machines, we identify their descriptions with integers. We let hti denote
the description of the Turing Machine t. In other words t0(hti) is the output of the Turing Machine
t0 when the input is the description of the Turing Machine t. If we have two Turing Machines t1
and t2 we say that they are equivalent if they compute the same function, that is t1(x) = t2(x) for
all x. We say that a Turing Machine is nite if it halts on every input. A problem with a yes/no
4Canning [1992] shows that if the domain of possible players and games are appropriately restricted then Turing
Machines will play Nash Equilibria. These restrictions are fairly severe.
5This is obvious for Turing Machines. Since a program that checks an input to see if it is identical to itself requires
only enough memory to store itself and the input, it is also true for nite state machines.
6An alternative approach is to consider Bayesian priors as in Nachbar [1997].
7Occasionally we refer to Turing machines that take as input pairs of integers; since there is a computable 1-1 map
from pairs of integers to integers, such a machine can be understood as taking as input the single integer generated by
a xed map of this type.
2answer is decidable if there is a Turing machine that provides the output zero if the answer is no
and the output one if the answer is yes.
We consider a series of questions about the decidability of the functional equivalence of two
Turing machines. In each case, we ask if there is a Turing machine that can determine whether two
Turing machines are computationally equivalent. The answer to each question is no: the problem
is not decidable, or in other words, no Turing machine can determine equivalence in any of these
cases.
Question 1: Is it a decidable problem whether two Turing Machines are equivalent?
Question 2: Is it a decidable problem whether two nite Turing Machines are equivalent?
Question 3: Is there some Turing Machine t for which it is a decidable problem whether a
Turing Machine is equivalent to t?
Question 4: Is there some nite Turing Machine t for which it is a decidable problem whether
another nite Turing Machine is equivalent to t?
We should emphasize that the problem of functional equivalence of Turing machines has not
escaped the notice of computer scientists. For example, Question 1 is essentially a restatement of
Rice's Theorem.8 Since the proofs are short, and the terminology of index sets used in Rice's
Theorem may not be familiar, we givesimple direct proofs that the answers to all of these questions
is no.
3. THE ANSWER
Our point of departure is the famous Halting Lemma that determining whether or not a Turing
Machine halts is not a decidable problem - that is, there is no Turing Machine which can take as
input the description of a Turing Machine and an integer n and compute 1 if it halts on n and 0 if
it does not. In other words, whether t(hti) halts or not is not decidable. For expositional purposes
we provide a proof for this result from which the answers to Questions 1-4 will follow.
Halting Lemma. Whether a Turing Machine halts on itself is undecidable.
Proof. Suppose by contradiction, that there exists a Turing Machine t such that t(hti) = 1 if
t(hti) halts and zero otherwise. Construct the Turing Machine t0 as follows.
t0(hti) =

0 if t(hti) = 0
¥ if t(hti) = 1:
Then t0(ht0i) = 0 , t(ht0i) = 0 by the construction of t0. However, by the denition of t,
t(ht0i)= 0 is true if and only if t0 does not halt, that is, t0(ht0i)= ¥. So t0(ht0i)=0,t0(ht0i)=
¥ an obvious contradiction. 
We now answer each question in the negative by showing that if it had a positive answer then
we could nd a Turing Machine that determines whether t(hti) halts for any Turing Machine t,
contradicting the fact that this problem is undecidable.
In addition to the Halting Lemma, the other key ingredient in our proofs will be the idea of one
Turing machine simulating another. That is, if we are given as input the description of a Turing
machine hti and an input x we can as part of our design simply execute t(x) to see what the input
Turing machine t would do on the input x. Of course, t(x) might not halt, in which case the
machine we are designing would not halt either.
8See Corollary 6.1.5 in Cutland [1980].
3Answer to Question 1: Is it a decidable problem whether two Turing Machines are equivalent?
No. Fix a Turing Machine t. Dene t0 as follows. If x 6= hti then t0(x) = t(x). If x = hti then
t0(hti) = ¥. To construct t0 is easy. It is almost identical to t, except that rst it checks whether
the input is hti or not. If it is, it runs forever, otherwise it simulates t. Notice, that in order to dene
t0 one does not need to know whether t(hti) halts or not. Observe, that t and t0 are equivalent if
and only if t(hti) does not halt. Hence, if there was a Turing Machine which determines whether
t and t0 are equivalent, it could also determine whether t(hti) halts or not.
Answer to Question 2: Is it a decidable problem whether two nite Turing Machines are equiv-
alent? No. Fix a Turing Machine t. Dene the Turing Machine b t as follows: b t(n) = 1 if t(hti)
did not halt after n steps, and zero otherwise. Let e t be a Turing Machine such that e t(n) = 1 for all
n. Notice that b t and e t are nite, and in addition they are equivalent if and only if t(hti) does not
halt. Hence a machine that could determine if two nite machines are equivalent could determine
if t(hti) halts.
Answer to Question 3: Is there some Turing Machine t for which it is a decidable problem
whether a Turing Machine is equivalent to t? No. Before we start to answer the question, note
that there is a Turing Machine ts such that if t halts on at least one input, then ts(hti) is an input
on which t halts. The way to construct ts is the following. First ts simulates the rst step of t on
1. Then if ts simulated the nth step of t on k, for n 6= 1, it will simulate the n 1th step of t on









and so forth. Once ts nds a step where t halts, it stops and its output is the input of t on which it
halted.
Let t be some arbitrary Turing Machine, and let t¥ denote a Turing Machine which does not
halt on any input. Suppose by contradiction that there exists a Turing Machine b t such that it is
decidable whether or not b t is equivalent to another Turing Machine. This would mean that there
exists a Turing Machine t such that t(ht0i) = 1 if t0 is equivalent tob t and zero otherwise.
We now construct a Turing Machine e t as follows. The construction depends on which of the
following two cases holds.
Case 1: t(ht¥i) = 1. Then denee t as follows. If x 6= 1;e t(x) =b t(x). If x = 1, thene t simulates
t on hti. Thuse t(1) halts if and only if t(hti) does.
Case 2: t(ht¥i) = 0. Since this means that b t is not equivalent to t¥, it implies that b t halts
for some input. Hence ts(hb ti) is well-dened. This enables us to dene e t(x) = b t(x) whenever
x 6= ts(hb ti). If x = ts(hb ti), then
 First: e t simulates t on hti. If it halts then
 Second: e t simulatesb t on x = ts(hb ti) and provides the same output as b t.
Soe t(ts(hb ti)) halts if and only if e t is functionally equivalent to b t.
We conclude that t(hti) halts if and only if (t(t¥);t(e t)) 2 f(1;0);(0;1)g. So t can deter-
mine if t(hti) halts.
4Answer to Question 4: Is there some nite TuringMachinet for whichit is a decidableproblem
whether another nite Turing Machine is equivalent to t? No. Suppose by contradiction that there
exists a nite Turing Machine b t such that it is decidable whether or not b t is equivalent to another
nite Turing Machine. Fix a Turing Machine t and construct a Turing Machine e t as follows. On
input n; e t simulates the rst n steps of t on hti. Then e t computes b t(n): If t halts before the nth
step on hti thene t(n) 6=b t(n); otherwisee t(n) =b t(n). Obviously,e t is nite becauseb t is also nite.
Furthermore,e t andb t are equivalent if and only if t(hti) does not halt.
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